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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION, a corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CASE NO. 6049

STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The statement of facts and the recital of statutes as
detailed in the plaintiff's brief present a good discussion
of the facts and law before this court. For the purpose of
this brief it will be necessary for certain facts to be added
to those of the plaintiff's brief, both in this preliminary
discussion and later in the presentation of the argument.
During the two years prior to 1935, which is the year
in question, the plaintiff, hereinafter referred to as the
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company, operated in Utah as a parent corporation which
disposed of the products of two subsidiary Utah corporations, the Utah Packing Company and the Morgan Canning
Company. In filing corporation franchise tax returns, a
separate accounting basis was used by each corporation to
report the net income arising in this state and attributable
to that corporation. The plaintiff, in the year 1935, consolidated the operations of all its subsidiaries in the United
States and elsewhere into one corporation, and instead of
filing returns to the State of Utah based upon the separate
operations of each company within this state, filed one
return based upon the consolidated operations. This change
resulted in the difference of opinion as to the proper method
of allocating to the State of Utah the net income from business done in this state.
Since the inception of the Utah Corporation Franchise
Tax Act, it has been the conviction of the members of the
commission that to administer properly this tax law, there
was a higher duty delegated to them than to sit idly by and
to accept the returns as filed by corporations doing business
in this state. Certainly, the legislature intended this commission to collect the tax on the net income on all business
done in the State of Utah. Guided by the provisions of the
statute imposing this tax, and limited by the boundaries of
the Constitution of Utah and of the United States, methods
have been pursued to carry out this intent of the legislature.
Plaintiff has seen fit, because of the national and international nature of its operations, to consolidate its subsidiary corporations and to change its methods of accounting. As a result of such change, its records apportioned to
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the State of Utah less income from its activities in this state,
than, in the opinion of the commission, actually resulted
from such operations. This fact will be further discussed
in the argument under Point 2.
This court must decide whether, under such circumstances, the State Tax Commission has authority to collect
a franchise tax on the net income of the operations of a
foreign corporation in Utah; and if it has such authority,
whether the methods employed by the commission in computing the assessment in question were arbitrary or unreasonable.

QUESTIONS INVOLVED
The questions, which we deem necessary to discuss
herein, may be classified in the following points. These
follow closely the order of the questions of law of the plaintiff's brief, though for obvious reasons, we have adopted
our own statements of the problem.
1. The Utah Corporation Franchise Tax Act delegates
authority to the commission to depart from the statutory
allocation formula in order to apportion the net income
fairly and equitably attributable to this state.
2. The evidence in this case justified the commission's
actions in departing from the statutory allocation fraction.
3.

The action of the commission was not unreasonable

nor arbitrary, and, therefore, it did not deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process of law.
4.

The plaintiff cannot claim that a departure from

4

the statutory allocation formula is a violation of its rights
unless it sustains the burden of proving that the method of
apportionment adopted by the commission is unconstitutional.
5. The inclusion of financial revenue from intangibles
in the measure of the corporation franchise tax is statutory
and constitutional.

ARGUMENT
Points 1, 2 and 3 are in the exact order of the questions of law of the plaintiff's brief. Point 4 has been added
as an entirely new question involved, while Point 5 is a combined discussion of the last three questions of law discussed
by the plaintiff.

POINT I
THE UTAH CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX ACT
DELEGATES AUTHORITY TO THE COMMISSION
TO DEPART FROM THE STATUTORY ALLOCATION FORMULA IN ORDER TO APPORTION THE
NET INCOME FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THIS STATE.
The first main point at issue is raised by plaintiff's
contention that there is no statutory foundation which will
justify the commission, in its decision, in departing from
the statutory manner of determining the sales factor in
computing the corporation's gross receipts from business
assignable to Utah, but that, on the contrary, the decision of
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the commission was entirely arbitrary and unwarranted by
reason of law. The defendant strongly disagrees with this
contention and maintains that its decision should be upheld
by virtue of the correct construction of the statute, the conclusions of authoritative students on this involved question,
the facts of the instant case, and the decisions of the highest
tribunals of other states and the United States.
It is elementary that the commission has the authority
of examining the corporation franchise tax return filed by
the taxpayer to determine whether the tax reported conforms to the requirements of law, as such a delegation of
power is necessary and fundamental in the administering of
the act. This specific power is definitely granted by Section 80-13-27, Hevised Statutes of Utah, 1933. Without this
authority, the commission would be so limited in its power
that it would have to rely completely upon each corporation
to file a true return and pay a fair tax.
Subsection 8 of Section 21 of the Utah Franchise Tax
Act has been interpreted by the plaintiff's counsel as solely
a limitation on the authority of the tax commission. Because
we place an entirely different construction on this section,
we are quoting it in its entirety in order to justify the authority which we maintain is delegated thereunder:
"If in the judgment of the tax commission the
application of the foregoing rules does not allocate
to this state the proportion of net income fairly and
equitably attributable to this state, it may with such
information as it may be able to obtain make such
allocation as is fairly calculated to assign to this
state the portion of net income reasonably attributable to the business done within this state and to
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation."
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We ask the court to read this section and omit the final
phrase "and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double
taxation." Read in this light, it is apparent that the section
has a meaning in and of itself delegating to the State Tax
Commission broad powers to arrive at an allocation which
will assign to this state the correct net income.
This section of the statute, omitting the phrase "and to
avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation," was
modeled after similar provisions of income and franchise
tax acts in other states, in which the tax had been upheld as
constitutional. These acts had later been declared unconstitutional because there was no relief for the taxpayer in
the event that the statutory allocation imposed double taxation. In other words, the delegation to the taxing authorities was one-sided by permitting them to depart from the
statutory allocation formula to benefit the state, but not permitting a departure when the use of the statutory formula
was unfair to the taxpayer. With this difficulty in mind, it
is our opinion that the Utah legislature added this final
phrase in order to protect the right of the taxpayer, and at
the same time to retain the authority of the tax commission
to allocate to the state the portion of net income reasonably
attributable to the business done within the state. We reiterate that this last phrase was appended to the section for
the sole purpose of protecting the taxpayer, and which section, standing alone, would delegate to the tax commission
the authority the legislature intended the commission to
have. Economists, accountants and courts have all approved
the delegation of such power to the tax commission as the

7
only solution of the difficult problem of making a correct
apportionment.
Plaintiff's counsel has emphasized that at the time the
Utah Tax Revision Commission was appointed to study
the tax structure of this state and to devise a corporation
tax which would be constitutional, the difficulty was encountered of allocating to the various states only that proportion of income which arises from business done in each
such state. Although this Tax Revision Commission was
faced with the problem that a strict formula might be declared unconstitutional because it would, in some instances,
result in double taxation, it was also faced with a greater
problem of devising a method which would fit any type of
corporation in this state. This latter difficulty has been
discussed fully by students of the problem. A very learned
discussion and the difficulties encountered is to be found
in the article "State Jurisdiction of Income," by Henry
Rottschaeffer, 44 Harvard Law Review 1082. A pertinent
section is quoted herewith :
"Thus the formulae for allocating a unitary income, like those applied to property taxes under the
'unit rule' must take due account of factors reflecting the distribution of the system value among its various parts. The character of the problem is such
that even economists would disagree as to what factors most nearly reflect the relative contribution of
the activities in the various states to the production
of the total unitary income. There is no doubt that
better methods could be devised than those that have
already received judicial sanction * * * A test of
what is reasonable and what is arbitrary cannot be
devised apart from economic analysis, but it is cer-
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tain that courts will not insist on any very rigid adherence to the refinements of economic theory as to
the imputation of income to its economic sources. It
is still an undecided question whether due process requires direct assignment of income when that is practicable, but statutes sometime require it. States contemplabing income taxes might well make provisions
permitting exceptions to their usual allocation formulae, and provide an alternative phrased in language
broad enough to admit of great flexibility in application, but not so broad as to fail to any standard whatever. The existence of income taxes in some states,
and their ab131ence in others, has led to attempts to
'siphon' the income from the former into the latter.
* * * This far courts have refused to permit
the use of corporate forms for this purpose and have
determined the income assignable to the state by
treating the business within the state as an integral
par·t of the L0;rger business undertaking by the group
of affiliated corporations. The constitutional power
of 0; state to enact statutes tha,t permit or require
such treatment of the income of a group of related
corporations, has not been determined, but it is
scarcely conceivable that due process will be so extended as to forbid the adoption of adequate measures for preventing the perversions of economic fact
usually present when these deviSres are employed."
(Italics Ours.)
Roswell Magill, Columbia Law School authority on taxation, has arrived at a similar conclusion in his article
"Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract," found in
44 Harvard Law Review 953:
"It seems undesirable in this present formative state for state legislatures to adopt mandatory
apportionment formulae applicable to all cases; rath-
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er, a considerable discretion should be vested in the
taxing authorities not only in the acquisition of information but also in the apportionment of income.
As research and experience make more data available, more definite methods for the allocation of income to the several states can no doubt be worked
out, just as elimination of double taxation is gradually being accomplished in the field of inheritance
and estate taxation."
If we keep in mind these conclusions while reading

Subsection 8 of Section 21, supra, we are justified in stating
that the Tax Revision Commission, which proposed the franchise tax act, has adopted a desirable statute. A standard
formula is provided, yet provision is made for an alternative basis whereby adequate measures can be taken to protect the rights of the taxpayers against double taxation, and
at the same time the state can receive the just and fair
amount of tax due it.
With this discussion in mind, we can direct our attention to the action taken by other states in this respect, and
the approval accorded by the decisions of their courts. We
deem the cases cited in plaintiff's brief under its first question of law on Pages 15 to 21 to be very material in later
discussing Point 3 of this brief, but these cases do not hold
that the legislatures of the respective jurisdictions were deprived of delegating to the tax officials the authority to
depart from a strict formula. The case of Porto Rico Mere.
vs. Gallardo, 6 F. (2d) 526, cited at page 21 of plaintiff's
brief, is not in point in deciding whether Subsection 8 is a
legal justification for the tax commission to depart from
the statutory formula to ascertain the proportion of income
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attributable to business in Utah, because Porto Rico had
no provision for any departure from the normal fraction
irrespective of the circumstances.
Evidently, plaintiff's counsel have misread the court's
decision in the case of Western Telegraph Company vs.
Query, 144 S. C. 244, 142 S. E. 509, cited at page 22 of their
brief. As we read the case, the facts and holdings are as
follows: The State of South Carolina levied an income tax
of one-third the amount of tax paid to the United States
on the net income derived from business done in that state.
The statute made no distinction between intrastate and interstate business. The taxpayer filed a return claiming that
no income resulted from business done in that state. The
tax commission assessed a tax by apportioning to the State
of South Carolina the net income shown on the Federal
returns which it considered to have resulted from business
done in the state. This apportionment was done under a
statute which provided that if the taxpayer failed to make
such an allocation, then the tax commission was required
to make the allocation; and the commission was authorized
to formulate rules and regulations necessary for such allocation of the income.
The lower court held that the taxes were assessed according to the allocation formula devised by the tax commission and were collected in accordance with the law. The
lower court further held that the case of Commonwealth vs.
Lorillard, 129 Va. 74, 105 S. E. 683, cited at page 22 of plaintiff's brief, was not in point because the statute in Virginia
did not delegate any discretionary or administrative powers
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to the Virginia authorities as the South Carolina Act did to
the tax commission.
In upholding the lower court's decision, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina confirmed this distinction and held
the statute constitutional in the following words:
"It is most earnestly urged, and particularly
under the case of Commonwealth v. Lorillard, 129
Va. 74, 105 S. E. 683, that, under a statute claiming
to be similar to the statute here involved, as there
is no method of allocation provided by statute, the
taxing power could not devise a scheme of their own
by which to determine how much of the total income
was derived from business done in this state. His
honor, Judge Townsend, has pointed out in his order
the difference between the statute in Virginia, upon
which the Lorillard Case was predicated, and our
statute, and has rightly reached the conclusion from
the nature of the act, that the tax commission had
authority to make the assessment and collect the tax.
Having found that the tax was rightfully assessed
and levied, a discussion of the other matter is largely
academic."
The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled on this identical
question in permitting the adoption of another allocation
fraction not provided by the legislature, State Revenue Commission vs. Edward Brothers Company, 194 S. E. 505.
Georgia had assessed a corporation tax return on a foreign
corporation which had a mine in the state and sold its
products in a foreign state.
The Court upheld the act of the commission allocating
the income from such sales to Georgia, and differentiated
the Georgia Act from the Virginia Act, under which the

12
case of Commonwealth vs. P. Lorillard Company, supra, was
decided. The Court, referring to the Commonwealth vs.
Lorillard case, said :
"That decision simply held that the statute taxing the entire income of a nonresident, in the absence
of any contemplation of apportionment, was invalid,
and that the administrative body could not make the
tax effective by providing a method of apportionment contrary to the express provisions of the statute. It is stated in 61 C. ,J. 1582, that 'A statute
giving an assessing officer or tax commission authority to make such rules and regulations as may
be deemed necessary in order to carry out the provisions of an income tax statute or the administration
thereof is to be given a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose, and such officer or board is thereby
authorized to prescribe and enforce any regulation
designed to carry out the provisions of the tax statute and not contrary thereto; but no rule or regulation may be validly adopted which does not conform to, or conflicts with, the provisions of the statute imposing the tax.' "
And further, in a classic statement, justifying the
adoption of the commission's administrative formula:
"In Throop on Public Officers, Paragraph 542,
it is stated: 'The rule respecting such powers is,
that, in addition to the powers expressly given by
statute to an officer or a board of officers, he or it
has, by implication, such additional powers, as are
necessary for the due and efficient exercise of the
powers expressly granted, or as may be fairly implied from the statute granting the express powers.'
So we conclude that the commission, under the provisions of the statute, even if not expressly, did, by
necessary implication, have the power, upon failure

13
of the taxpayer to do so, to determine the proportion
provided for in the taxing statute."
The latest case on this point, Corn vs. Fort, 95 S. W.
(2d) 620, decided June 13, 1936, is, in our opinion, of great
importance in that the court had before it all of the cases
cited by the plaintiff herein. Then, too, the state involved,
Tennessee, had just amended its act in order to profit by the
decision and the experience of other states. The legislature
realized the difficulties which would be encountered both
by the tax commission in administering the act and by the
taxpayer in filing returns, if a strict formula were devised
from which no departure could be made. It, therefore, enacted in Section 4 of the act the following provision:
"The Legislature hereby declares that no adequate
set formula can be adopted for the determination of
that proportion of the capital employed in Tennessee
in case of entities having property both within and
without this State which said formula would be
equitable to all entities under all circumstances and
for that reason has not undertaken to adopt such set
formula believing that the judicial right of review of
the Commissioner's allocation mentioned will prove
more equitable as a whole than any set formula
which it might adopt, but it expressly declares that
it is made the duty of the Commissioner to take into
consideration in making his allocations any and all
of the above mentioned comparisons andjor ratios
which will be appropriate in the determination with
respect to the entity under consideration of the
amount of capital employed by it in this State, and
all other relevant facts."
The formula provided by the legislature for the guidance of the Commissioner in apportioning the proper net
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income is practically identical with the formula used by the
State Tax Commission in the instant case. We are, therefore, setting it forth in its entirety:
"That in the case of entities having property
located both in this State and elsewhere the Commissioner is hereby authorized and empowered to
adopt such method as he may deem adequate and
equitable both to the State and to the taxpayer in
determining the amount of capital as hereinabove
defined properly allocable to this State and employed
by the entity in this State. In determining the
amount of such capital employed by the entity in
question in this State, the Commissioner shall take
into consideration the extent of the tangible property of such entity in this State as compared to the
extent of the entire property of the entity wherever
located; the gross receipts of the entire entity; the
value of goods, wares and merchandise manufactured
or maintained here as compared to the gross value
of goods manufactured or maintained by such entity everywhere."
The court in this case of Corn vs. Fort held that such
a broad delegation of power was constitutional:
"We can see no illegal delegation of authority to
the commissioner. Certain definite formula is set
out in the act for his guidance. He can look to other
things in ascertaining the value of the property, as a
particular case might demand. Had this right been
withheld from him, injustice could arise. The annotator who prepared the note to Hans Rees' Sons
v. North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75
L. Ed. 879, says, in part:
'In the second place, it seems undesirable,
in this present formative stage, for state legislatures to adopt mandatory apportionment
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formula applicable to all cases; rather, a considerable discretion should be vested in the taxing authorities, not only in the acquisition of
information, but also in the apportionment of
income.'"
Thus, we see that a legislature has put into practice the
conclusions of Professor Magill, supra, and subsequently the
highest court of that state has upheld such delegation.
Counsel for the defendant have cited at great length
at pages 20 and 21 of their brief the opinion of Mr. Justice
Cardoza in the case of People ex rei Studebaker Corporation
of America vs. Gilchrist et al., State Tax Commission, 155
N. E. 68, 244 N. Y. 144. This was not a case, however, of
departing from a normal allocation formula, but a case in
which the State Tax Commission saw fit to demand a consolidated return and thereby to look beyond the corporate
entity within the state's jurisdiction. The facts and the decision are entirely foreign to the question before this court,
and any dictum rendered by this learned judge in regard to
the right of a state to demand a consolidated return in order
to tax the profits of a corporation not qualified to do business under the laws of the state, should not be given any
consideration in determining the issue before us.
On the other hand, we deem it more important to direct
this court's attention to the case of United States Advertising Corporation vs. Lynch, 1 Fed. Supp., 302, decided in the
District Court of the Southern District of New York. An
assessment made by the tax commission of New York, after
a hearing, was contested. In commenting on the statute
providing for an alternative allocation fraction, which is
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analogous to Utah's provision and set out in the following
quotation from the decision, the court stated :
"The usual method provided by the statute for
allocating income to sources within and without the
state is under the rule or formula which somewhat
arbitrarily segregates the assets of the corporation.
Section 211, par. 4, reads as follows: 'If it shall appear to the tax commission that the segregation of
assets shown by the report does not properly reflect
the corporate activity or business done, or the income
earned from corporate activity or from business
done in this state because of the character of the corporation's business and the character and location
of its assets, the tax commission is authorized and
empowered to equitably adjust the tax upon the basis
of the corporate activity or the business done within
and without the state rather than upon capital or
assets employed.'
"Such a method is regarded as valid. Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission,
266 U.S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, 69 L. Ed. 282; Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41
S. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; S. S. Kresge Co. v. Bennett
(D. C.) 51 F. (2d) 353, except in such instances
where the method results in unreasonably including
in the tax base income earned without the state.
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina ex rei. Maxwell,
283 U.S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, 75 L. Ed. 879. To avoid
such a situation the alternative method for equitable
assessment upon the basis of the corporate activity
or business done within and without the state has
been provided, with the object of preventing arbitrary, discriminatory, and unequal assessments
which might arise under certain conditions if the
segregation of assets rule or formula was used. It
applies to every corporation, foreign or domestic,
where the segregation of assets does not properly
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reflect the business or activity of the corporation.
It allocates the corporate income to the states where
the business producing that income was carried on
and in proportion to the business transacted in each
state. The statute is definite in stating that the
occasions are those when it shall appear 'That the
segregation of assets shown by the report does not
properly reflect the corporate activity or business
done, or the income earned from corporate activity
or from business done in this state because of the
character of the corporation's business * * *
and location of its assets,' and the basis of the allocation is the corporate activity or business done
within or without the state. The position of the defendant is certainly strengthened by the enactment
of the present provision, and it seems to me that in
view of the decision in Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis
(D. C.) 274 F. 975, affirmed 266 U. S. 265, 45 S.
Ct. 80, 69 L. Ed. 279, it is no longer open to question.
It also seems to be settled that this court will not
in an equity proceeding enjoin the collection of the
state tax even though the taxpayer be without an
adequate remedy at law if the assessment of the tax
is due to an error on the part of the assessing officers and not due to an unconstitutional statute.
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Travis, supra."
It is important to note that the federal court has dif-

ferentiated between the right to employ the method and an
unreasonable use of such method. We shall discuss this differentiation under Point 3. This federal case is squarely in
point and should conclusively prove that the statute delegates to the tax commission authority to depart from the
normal allocation fraction in order to fairly and equitably
apportion the proper net income to this state.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE JUSTIFIED THE COMMISSION'S ACTIONS IN DEPARTING FROM THE
STATUTORY ALLOCATION FACTOR.
The next question is how much evidence and facts must
the commission have before it to justify the use of some
other formula to arrive at the correct proportion of net income to be allocated to this state. It is elementary that each
type of business derives its income from different operations. One formula which would be fair to a taxpayer engaged in the mercantile business might not be fair to a
corporation engaged in the mining business. Similarly, a
formula which will be fair to the corporation engaged in the
mining business may not allocate to the State of Utah the
net income from the operations of a corporation engaged in
the building and loan business. There is the further difficulty that the formula, as applied to one corporation, will be
fair to both the taxpayer and state; but as applied to another corporation carrying on the same type of business
with a different accounting system, or a different method
of distribution and sale, the formula would be either unfair
to the corporation or would not allocate to the state a just
proportion of the net income. These facts have been pointed
out by the authorities and by the courts, quoted heretofore,
as the basic reason for giving tax authorities the discretion
of applying different formulas.
It is the duty of the tax commission to investigate and
determine these corporations' activities so that the correct
formula can be applied to arrive at the correct net income.
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In the course of such research, the state tax commission has
frequently found it advisable to eliminate one or more of the
statutory factors in determining the net income of mining
companies and of building and loan companies. It has also
been found that where local manufacturing companies have
shipped their products out of the state for sale, to allocate
such sales and the net income therefrom out of the state
does not allocate to Utah a just proportion of the net income
attributable to this state. Therefore, a more proper allocation should be calculated.
What are the facts in this particular case which were
before the commission when it deemed a departure from
the statutory allocation fraction necessary? In 1933 the
operations within Utah, as evidenced by the consolidated
return for that year of the California Packing Corporation
and the Utah Packing Corporation, showed gross receipts
from business in Utah of $118,176.33. In 1934, by this same
evidence, gross receipts allocated to Utah were $143,689.99.
But in the year 1935, despite the same operations of the same
property, there were reported to the tax commission no
gross receipts from business in Utah, due to the change in
accounting methods and corporate organization. Such information conclusively proved to the commission that if
there ever were an instance in which its judgment should
be exercised to find that the formula used by the taxpayer
did not allocate the proportion of net income fairly and
equitably attributable to this state, this was the time.
The tax commission was then faced with the problem
of calculating an allocation formula which would assign to
this state the portion of net income reasonably attributable
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to the business done within this state. The statutory formula, set out in plaintiff's brief at pages 3 to 5, is based
upon (1) tangible property in Utah, (2) salaries and wages
payable in Utah, and (3) gross receipts from business done
in Utah. In adopting a proper formula to measure this
company's tax, the first two factors were left unchanged,
as they were not affected by the taxpayer's reorganization
of accounting methods and corporate structure. The crux
of the problem was to determine what were the gross receipts from ~usiness assignable to this state. During 1933
and 1934, when the operations of the company were carried
on by subsidiary corporations, the gross receipts could be
determined from the taxpayer's return, because the company reported the value of the products manufactured and
subsequently distributed by the parent corporation. In the
year in question, the value of these products could only be
determined, according to the company's records, on the basis
of the amount received by it from the sale of such products.
We submit that it was unreasonable for a company
which operated property in this state, valued at $1,121,746.55, to have no gross receipts from this property in Utah.
The only possible means of determining the gross receipts:
in this state were from the sales of the products produced.j
in the state. As the record will show, the tax commission
endeavored to ascertain the total sales price of the merchandise packed and shipped from the corporation's Utah plants.
This figure was necessary in order to allocate the income
from the sale of the merchandise to the state in which it
originated, which is Utah.
There are three bases to be used in determining the
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proper allocation of sales. They are: (1) the origin of the
...

-

~

goods, (2) the location of the sales office, and (3) the
d estination of the products. In its judgment, because of

the particular facts, the second, or location of sales office
theory, has always been deemed by the commission to be
inapplicable, because any taxpayer could easily transfer its
sales office outside Utah and thus defeat any allocation of
sales. The third, or destination theory, has been minimized
by the commission in practice as not being as equitable or
economically sound as the origin theory. Consequently, the
first or origin theory has been adopted by the commission
in other instances and was used in this instance. From an
economic standpoint, such a conclusion is justified whether
the sales are made in this state or in another state. The sales
price is only indicia of the receipts from the manufacturing
operations. Although greater profits may be derived from
the sale and distribution of the products, it cannot be denied
that the operation of a corporation of more than a million
dollars' worth of property produces receipts which should
be taken into account in determining an allocation fraction
to apportion to this state a fair and equitable portion of the
net income of the corporation's entire activities.
One state has specifically legislated into its allocation
formula this origin theory. Wisconsin in 1929 amended its
act so that one of the factors used in the allocation formula
was the ratio of the total cost of manufacturing within that
state to the total cost of the manufacturing everywhere.
Included in the total cost was to be the cost of all goods,
materials and supplies used in manufacturing, the total
wages and salaries paid in manufacturing and the total
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overhead. The third factor was the sales factor. Commerce
Clearing House has issued an annotation discussing whether
the enactment by the legislature of such a definite rule governing apportionment, supersedes the United States Supreme Court ruling in the United States Glue case (to be
discussed later) that the profit on a sale of goods manufactured in Wisconsin is taxable in Wisconsin, regardless of
from what point the sales of products or deliveries are made.
In summarizing the practice of the Wisconsin Tax Commission the Commentator stated:
"Generally, the cases in which an apportionment are allowed have been largely increased in number, but a decided tendency toward continuing the
effect of the Glue Case Rule even when an apportionment is permitted has been evidenced. Where
either a fo'reign or domestic manufa,cturing corporation operating within and without the state operates
a factory within W,isconsin, the general practice now
is to require that the selling value of the product
nw.nufactured in Wisconsin be credited to that state
in the 'sale mtio' of the appor·tionment computa,tion
although the product mamtfactured in the state is
actually sold from a regularly established and maintained, bona fide sa,les offic·e outside Wisconsin.
In other wm·ds, instead of criediting Wisconsin in the
apportionment ratios with only those elements actually appearing in the state according to the statutory 'rule, namely, tangible properties and manufactu.ring costs, a sales element hM been injected represented by the selling value of the product manufactured in Wisconsin." (Italics Ours.)
Therefore, we maintain that there was sufficient evidence before the defendant to justify a departure from the
statutory allocation fraction as applied to this company
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and that the fraction ultimately adopted was economically
sound and justly and equitably attributed to this state the
proportion of net income reasonably assigned to business
done within Utah.

POINT III
THE ACTION OF THE COMMISSION WAS NOT UNREASONABLE NOR ARBITRARY, AND, THEREFORE, IT DID NOT DEPRIVE THE PLAINTIFF OF
ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
The adoption of the sales factor in allocating the net income of the business done in this state is not an unreasonable or arbitrary measure of the gross receipts. A formula
based on this factor does not deprive a foreign corporation
of property without due process of law, according to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In
fact, the trend of decisions indicates that the highest tribunal will not interfere with the state's assessment based on
such a method unless the formula has been unreasonably
applied. To prove conclusively that such is the trend, we
shall in some detail outline the development of the law on
this highly controversial constitutional issue.
The basic case on this subject is United States Glue Co.
v. Oak Creek (1918) 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499. The court
there held that a state, in levying a general income tax upon
the gains and profits of a corporation, may include in the
computation of tax the net income derived from the sale
of goods manufactured in the state, shipped outside of the
state and sold to residents of foreign states through branch
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offices located outside of the state, without contravening
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Cases cited to confirm the right of a state to levy an
income tax on the net income derived from local property
and business which is owned and operated by a resident of
another state are the companion cases of Shaffer v. Carter,
(1920) 252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, and Travis v. Yale and
Towne Manufacturing Company, (1920) 252 U. S. 60, 40
S. Ct. 228. The principles which are the foundation of all
excise and franchise taxes of the state are elucidated as
follows in the Shaffer case :
"In our system of government the States have
general dominion, and, saving as restricted by particular provisions of the Federal Constitution, complete dominion over all persons, property, and business transactions within their borders; they assume
and perform the duty of preserving and protecting
all such persons, property, and business, and, in
consequence, have the power normally pertaining to
governments to resort to all reasonable forms of
taxation in order to defray the governmental expenses. Certainly they are not restricted to property
taxation, nor to any particular form of excises. In
well-ordered society, property has value chiefly for
what it is capable of producing, and the activities of
mankind are devoted largely to making recurrent
gains from the use and development of property,
from tillage, mining, manufacture, from the employment of human skill and labor, or from a combination of some of these; gains capable of being devoted to their own support and the surplus accumulated as an increase of capital. That the State, from
whose laws, property and business and industry derive the protection and security without which pro-
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duction and gainful occupation would be impossible,
is debarred from exacting a share of those gains in
the form of income taxes for the support of the government, is a proposition so wholly inconsistent with
fundamental principles as to be refuted by its mere
statement. That it may tax the land but not the crop,
the tree but not the fruit, the mine or well but not
the product, the business but not the profit derived
from it, is wholly inadmissible.
"Income taxes are a recognized method of distributing the burdens of government, favored because requiring contributions from those who realize
current pecuniary benefits under the protection of
the government and because the tax may be readily
proportioned to their ability to pay.
"And we deem it clear, upon principle as well as
authority, that just as a State may impose general
income taxes upon its own citizens and residents
whose persons are subject to its control, it may, as
a necessary consequence, levy a duty of like character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes accruing to non-residents from their property
or business within the State, or their occupations
carried on therein; enforcing payment, so far as it
can, by the exercise of a just control over persons
and property within its borders."
The question of allocation of net income was first
raised, and, it was apparently thought decided, in the case
of Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain (1920) 254
U. S. 113, 41 S. Ct. 45. Because the United States Supreme
Court in its later decisions has implied that its holding in
this case should have been the authoritative guide on this
question, we shall set forth in detail the facts and the law:
The foreign corporation maintained a factory in Connecticut; the products of this factory were sold and rented
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through its main office in New York City. The tax was
computed on the net profits apportioned according to the
property in the state as compared to all property. The court
held the tax was not in contravention of the commerce
clause, and, of more significance, that it was not imposed
on income from business conducted beyond the state's borders. The fact that most of the profit (80''/'o) was received
in other states was not sufficient proof that the formula
was unreasonable. "The profits of the corporation were
largely earned by a series of transactions beginning with
manufacture in Connecticut and ending with the sale in
other states." The method, not being inherently arbitrary,
was upheld.
Then in the case of Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton v. State
Tax Commission (1924) 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82, cited
at page 19 of plaintiff's brief, the court upheld an allocation
formula used in the franchise tax act of New York. It held
that a foreign corporation cannot defeat a franchise tax
assessed against it for the privilege of doing business in a
state where a portion of its sales are made, if the tax is
based upon the proportion of its net income which its assets
within the state bear to its total assets, though the corporation's records assigned no net income to that state. The
objections, that the company was being deprived of its
property without due process of law, or that the tax was
an unconstitutional burden on foreign commerce, were overruled. The court held that New York was acting within its
rights in devising some formula to tax the income of a
unitary business.
On a first reading of the case of Hans Rees' Sons v.
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North Carolina, 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385, cited at pages
17 and 23 of plaintiff's brief, the court apparently reverses
its former position. But the court differentiated the facts
therein and the Underwood Typewriter Company case in
holding that the rule of the latter could not be extended so
as to tax all the net income in one state.
"These decisions are not authority for the conclusion that where a corporation manufactures in
one state and sells in another, the net profits of
the entire transaction, as a unitary enterprise, may
be attributed, regardless of evidence to either state."
Thus the Supreme Court did not reverse its former position, as will be further brought out in this discussion. The
court held that North Carolina had gone beyond the limitations prescribed in taxing the profits "which in no just
sense (are) attributable to transactions within its jurisdictions," but the court did not hold that a proper formula
for allocation purposes could not be used.
To summarize the effect of this decision, we next turn
our attention to the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Manufacturing Co. (1933) 204 N. C. 365, 368 S. E. 397. Because
the subsequent comment by the United States Supreme
Court on this decision is the latest authoritative ruling, and
the facts and law are similar to the instant case, we ask the
court's indulgence in reviewing this decision.
The statute provided for a tax against the corporation
on "such proportion of its entire net income as the fair
values of real estate and tangible property in this state is to
the fair cash values of its entire real estate and tangible
property owned by it." The corporation was a Delaware
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corporation which carried on a manufacturing business in
North Carolina. It allocated 58.538 per cent of its net income to the state by using such proportion as the value of
its tangible property in North Carolina bore to the value of
all of its property, tangible and intangible, within and without the state.
The state in arriving at its deficiency followed the statutory allocation fraction and excluded the value of intangibles as a factor. The intangibles consisted of cash, accounts
receivable, notes receivable, stock in other corporations and
prepaid expenses. Only one-third of the cash was deposited
in North Carolina.
The state's petition contained the following statement:
"As a statement of fact, rather than a contention for the allocation of petitioner's taxes, the sales
for the period of the report made without the state
were the sum of $1,545,485.94, or 99.8 per centum of
the total sales; and within the state, the sum of
$3,021.13, or 00.2 per centum of the total sales."

It was conceded that the business was unitary. As to
allocating the income of the unitary business, the court
stated:
"Conceding that a unitary business may produce an income which must be allocated to two or
more states in which its activities are carried on,
such a business may not be split up arbitrarily and
conventionally in applying the tax laws. It would
seem to be necessary that there should be some logical reference to the production of income; the distinction should be founded on a corresponding difference in apportionment of productive capital, in-
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vestment, or employment, within the unitary business.
"The mere statement of a witness as to the income separately derived from purcha.se, from manufacture, and from sale, without supporting data,
showing the influ.ence of each factor in producing
profit, gain, or income from thie separate operationssuch as should be allocated to it independently-is
merely an arbitrary guess. The bare fact of sale
produces no income. It is merely the act by which
the income is oaptured; the capital, the organization,
or effoTts which produce the sale are the things to
be considend in asceTtaining the amount of income
to be cTedited to the sale. Certa.inly, in a. unitarry
business, we must look further back than to the sale
itself or the activities which actua.lly pToduce it. The
tangible propeTty element of capital outlay is cared
for in the ta.ngible pToperty m.tio set up by the
srotute. If there is anything beyond that of sufficient magnitude to effect the constitutionality' of
the application of this nile, it must be shown in the
e1xidence; the lnaden resting upon the taxpayer to do
so." (Italics Ours.)
This opinion is the crux of the entire issue, and it is on
this reasoning that the sole question involved, namely, "was
the basis of taxation adopted by the commissioner of revenue arbitrary and unreasonable and in conflict with the
Interstate Commerce Clause and the F'ourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution," was answered in
the negative.
In upholding the tax, the court makes the following
points:
(1) "A state may not impose any tax which
results in laying a direct burden upon interstate
commerce. But a state may, in levying a general
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income tax, include within the taxable status so
much of net income derived from interstate commerce as is properly apportionable to operations
and business within the state. U. S. Glue Company
vs. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. Ed.
1135, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 748 Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 L. Ed. 445; Travis v. Yale
& Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 40 S. Ct. 228, 64
L. Ed. 460.
(2) "A tax upon the net income of such corporations is not a burden on interstate commerce,
simply because the products of the business are
shipped and sold out of the state.
(3) "A state may tax the net income of a foreign corporation doing business within its taxing
jurisdiction, and may include therein a portion of
such net income arising from interstate commerce,
properly apportionable to the state. Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41
S. Ct. 45, 65 L. Ed. 165; Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton vs.
State Tax Commission, 266 U. S. 271, 45 S. Ct. 82,
69 L. Ed. 282; Maxwell v. Hans Rees' Sons, 199 N.C.
42, 153 S. E. 850; Id., 283 U. S. 123, 51 S. Ct. 385,
75 L. Ed. 879.
( 4) "A state may set up a formula for determining that portion of net income properly attributable to business within the state, including that from
interstate operations. * * * In Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra, it sustained the
Connecticut statute identical with that of North
Carolina, which used the value of real estate and
tangible personal property within the state as the
numerator and the value of real estate and tangible
personal property, both within and without the state,
as the denominator of the formulatory fraction."
The final point determined in the Maxwell case was
the question to be considered next as to whether the state
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or the plaintiff has the burden of proving the unconstitutionality both of the statute and of its application.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld this
decision of the Maxwell case in 291 U. S. 642 by denying a
Writ of Certiorari in the following words:
"This case is controlled by the decision in Underwood Typewriter Company vs. Chamberlain,
rather than by the decision in the Hans Rees' Sons
case."
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFF CANNOT CLAIM THAT A DEPARTURE FROM THE STATUTORY ALLOCATION
FORMULA IS A VIOLATION OF ITS RIGHTS UNLESS IT SUSTAINS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
THAT THE METHOD OF APPORTIONMENT
ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is the contention of the defendant that at the official
hearing given the company with regard to the deficiency
assessment, and only at such hearing, could evidence have
been introduced to prove that the application of the formula
adopted by the commission was unreasonable and deprived
the company of its property without due process of law.
Section 80-13-47, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, which sets
forth the rules for review by this Supreme Court of the tax
commission's decision states:
"Upon the hearing no new or additional evidence may be introduced, but the cause shall be heard
on the record before the tax commission as certified to by it."
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The Legislature has delegated the quasi-judicial function to the tax commission as a trained body of determining
whether the allocation fraction works a fair and equitable
result.
A study of the hearing will reveal that, although the
company's representatives objected to the formula adopted
to measure the gross receipts, they were unable to furnish
figures to show how such a formula attributed a greater proportion of the net income to Utah than was justly attributable to the operations within the state.
Two important facts can be gleaned from the hearing
which is made a part of the record herein: ( 1) That the accounting records of the corporation could not show that the
net income during the year in question from the operations
in this state was less than the two years previous; (2)
That the objection submitted by the plaintiff to set up a
separate accounting basis to allocate the receipts from the
Utah operations in conformity with the "origin theory"
was that such accounting would be "messy and complicated."
Other than this, no affirmative evidence and conclusive
proof was furnished by the taxpayer to the tax commission
to show that the formula as applied to the plaintiff worked
an unconstitutional burden on it.
If the company's representatives had furnished evidence of the gross receipts of its operations in Utah, and the
commission had not substituted this evidence for the formula used, the plaintiff could truthfully claim that it had not
had due process. One rule of law stands out in all opinions
of the United States Supreme Court in cases involving the
allocation factor-that the burden is on the taxpayer at the
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hearing before the administrative body to prove the method
adopted by that body is discriminatory, and that the application of the formula is inherently arbitrary if it allocates
an unreasonably proportion of the net income to the state.
If the taxpayer has been unable to introduce evidence, the
statute and its application will be held as constitutional.
The burden rests upon the one who attacks the constitutionality of a statute in its applicability to him to overcome the presumption of facts supporting constitutionality,
which attaches to all legislative acts. Roberts and Schaefer
vs. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50, 46 S. Ct. 375; Goreib v. Fox,
274 U. S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675; Lawrence vs. Mississippi State
Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556.
In passing on the constitutionality of an Illinois Franchise Tax Act in Pump Hairpin Manufacturing Company vs.
Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 42 S. Ct. 305 the Supreme Court
recognized that the question was a practical one depending
upon the facts. The court stated:
"No formula has yet been devised by which it
can be determined in all cases whether or not such
a tax is valid; and applying the repeated declarations of this court, in the cases cited and in many
others, the question is inherently a practical one,
depending for its decision on the special facts of each
case."
In the case of Underwood Typewriter Company vs.
Chamberlain, supra, the court first recognized that the taxpayer must bear this burden of proving "special facts"
and held that the corporation did not introduce evidence to
show that the net income attributed to the state was unreasonable. We direct the court's attention to the plaintiff's
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brief, Pages 16 and 17, where this is admitted. Again in the
case of Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton vs. State Tax Commission, supra, the company was unable to prove that the application of the allocation formula produced an unreasonable result. Therefore, the court held the formula adopted
by New York to be valid. In the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., supra, the court h~d more facts before it than
in the two previous cases cited. In fact, it is apparent that
the corporation had furnished the information which the
State Tax Commission of Utah had requested of the plaintiff, but that such information was disregarded by the state
authorities. The court, in holding that North Carolina had
taken a disproportionate share of the profits of the corporation, declared that the allocation was thereby unreasonable.
"Undoubtedly, the enterprise of a corporation
which manufactures and sells its manufactured product is ordinarily a unitary business, and all the
factors in that enterprise are essential to the realization of profits. The difficulty of making an exact
apport'ionment is apparent and lvence, when the State
has adopted a method not intrinsically arbitrary,
it will be sustained until proof is offered of an unreasonable and arrbitrary application in particular
cases." (Italics ours.)
In our discussion of Maxwell vs. Kent-Coffey Company,
supra, at page 27 of this brief, we stated that the court,
as the fifth point of its decision, distinguished the basis of
holdings in the Hans Rees' Case from the Underwood Typewriter and the Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton cases. The court,
in this connection, said :
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"The appellee relies upon Maxwell v. Hans Rees'
Sons, supra, as supporting its contentions. The difference is that in the Hans Rees' Case, evidence was
presented breaking up the business into the separate
elements of buying, manufacturing, and selling. No
effort of that kind was made in the instant case."
The court then stated that it was following the Underwood Typewriter case and that although there 99% of
the net profits arose from sales in other states, and only
47%% of the net income was apportioned to Connecticut,
whereas in the instant case, 98.4% of the products were sold
out of the state and 19.2% of the income was assigned to
North Carolina, the cases were identical. As in the Underwood Typewriter case, the corporation merely asserted as
a defense that the tax was arbitrary and unreasonable and,
therefore, unconstitutional as taking its property without
due process of law or as being a burden upon interstate
commerce. In the Hans Rees' Case, however, distinguished
therefrom, the facts were presented to show how much of
the income could be chargeable to buying, how much to
manufacturing and how much to selling. By the introduction of the records it was proved that only 17% of the net
income arose from manufacturing, whereas 83% of its net
income was taxed.
Summarizing, the court in the Maxwell case concluded:
"Always, then, the burden rests upon the taxpayer to show that the allocation formula, set up
in the statute, produces such an arbitrary and unreasonable result as to be unconstitutional, as applied to the facts of the particular case. In the Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton Case, supra, it was said by the
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court, page 283 of 266 U. S., 45 S. Ct. 82, 84: 'It is
not shown in the present case, any more than in the
Underwood Case, that this application ofthe statutory
method of apportionment has produced an unreasonable result.' "
The deduction we have made above from these cases
is substantiated in the bulletin of the National Tax Association for May, 1931. The editor concludes that if a corporation can show that its business is divisible and that the
allocation fraction does not approximately reflect the true
division, the fraction cannot be used. He further states
that there are approximately two tests which the allocation
statute must meet: (1) It must be fair on its face; and (2)
must not operate unreasonably and arbitrarily in a particular case.
The annotator to the Hans Rees' case in 75 L. Ed.,
page 79, has arrived at a corolla ted conclusion:
"Allocation formulas, fair on their face, will
apparently be upheld, unless the taxpayer sustains
the burden of affirmatively proving that they operate unreasonably and arbitrarily in his particular
case."
After an exhaustive search through the records and the
plaintiff's brief, we are certain that this court will be unable to find that the plaintiff either at the hearing or to
date has furnished one iota of evidence or information to
sustain the burden that the tax commission has allocated
an unreasonable proportion of its net income to the State
of Utah, and as a consequence can arrive at the same conclusion as the court did in the case of S. S. Kresge v. Bennett,
51 F. (2d) 353, where it held:
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"Since the Plaintiff cannot show by the facts before us what its net income from New York State is,
but can merely estimate it, we do not think that there
is anything before us to sustain the contention that
the method of apportionment adopted by the Commission was unconstitutional. If the actual net income from the state cannot be demonstrated with
reasonable certainty, the commission can properly
be intrusted with some discretion in determining
what method to use in approximating it. It may
possibly be that the Plaintiff's figures are a somewhat closer approximation than the commission's,
but that would not warrant our holding the tax illegal if the commission's method was a reasonable
one. (Citing the Underwood Typewriter Co., the
Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, and the Hans Rees'
cases)"

POINT V
THE INCLUSION OF FINANCIAL REVENUE FROM
INTANGIBLES IN THE MEASURE OF THE CORPORATION FRANCHISE TAX IS STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL.
In keeping with the tax commission's attempt to reach
all the net income derived from business done in this state,
the allocation fraction was applied to the total net income of
the company. This net income included the income from intangibles. The plaintiff contends that the value of these intangibles should not be included in the allocation formula,
nor should the income therefrom be taxed, because such a
tax would result in double taxation.
The tax commission has taken the most logical stand in
regard to the taxation of this net income, in the same pro-
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portion as all other net income. Robert C. Brown, in his
article "Multiple Taxation by the States," has summarized
the doctrine that these intangibles have a situs wherever
the business of the corporation is conducted, at 48 Harvard
Law Review 420 in the following words:
"The most important exception to the rule that
intangible property is taxable at the domicile of the
owner is in the case of an indebtedness constituting
a part of the assets used in a continuous business;
It may then be taxed as property where the business
is carried on, even though the owner of the business
is a resident of another jurisdiction. This is the
doctrine generally referred to as 'the business situs
of credits,' and it is, or at least has been, almost universally accepted."
The intangibles in question have been accumulated as a
result of all the company's operations in all the states in
which it does business. It may be presumed, therefore, that
the intangible assets were realized in the identical proportion that the business done in Utah bears to the total business of the corporation. The assets originally having been
derived from the business wherever conducted, the income
from such assets, as it accrues, should be attributed to
wherever the business is carried on. Merely because the corporation holds the intangibles in one state where it might
do no business whatever except to receive dividends, or because its main business office is in another state, is no valid
reason why the situs of the property should be artificially
considered to be located in one of those states. Receiving
income from intangibles does not amount to doing business
in any one state or at any one particular place. Rather,
it is but incidental to the main business of the company, and
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having been derived from the principal activities of the company, the income from intangibles should be taxed in that
proportion which the operations in each state bear to the
total operations in all states. In such way, and only in such
way, may Utah, as well as the other states, fairly and equitably apportion the tax on such income. Granting that the
state tax commission has been delegated the power to achieve
such a result, it is claimed that no constitutional provision
is violated thereby.
The commission has not attempted to allocate the intangible assets as property having a taxable situs in Utah.
We maintain, however, that there is no equitable reason
why the net income from these intangibles should not be included as part of the net income subject to the apportionment formula. To admit that the net income of all the
corporation's operations is subject to a proper allocation
fraction, but to dispute the inclusion of the net income from
the intangibles, is an artificial and false classification on
the part of the company.
The case of Wheeling Steel Corporation vs. Fox, 298
U. S. 193, 80 L. Ed. 1143, cited at pages 33 and 34 in plaintiff's brief, has been emphasized by the plaintiff as a case
in point. We submit that there the court was construing
an ad valorem or property tax, which is a direct tax, and not
as herein an excise or indirect tax on the income from intangibles. There is a decided difference in the two. In
the general use of the allocation fraction we do not base
the tax upon the ground that the situs of property is in Utah,
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but we merely allocate that proportion of net income reasonably attributed to business done in Utah.
That property only has a situs at the domicile of the
owner is refuted by the United States Supreme Court in
Wheeling Steel Corporation case in the following statement:
"When we deal with intangible property, such
as credits and choses in action generally, we encounter the difficulty that by reason of the absence of
physical characteristics they have no situs in the
physical sense, but have the situs attributable to
them in legal conception."
The same defenses that have been raised by the plaintiff were argued before the Supreme Court of the United
States in the recent case of Matson Navigation Company
vs. State Board of Equalization, 297 U. S. 441, 56 S.
Ct. 553. The State Tax Commission of Utah in this respect has been guided by the procedure of the California
Board of Equalization in administering the corporation
franchise tax of Utah because Utah's act more closely parallels California's act than that of any other state, including
Massachusetts, after whose act both of the western states'
acts were modeled. The Supreme Court of the United States
in the Matson Navigation Company case upheld the action
of California in applying the allocation formula to all the
net income of the corporation. The court held that if the
state has jurisdiction to exact a tax for the privilege of doing
business in the state, it is immaterial how the income which
is used to measure the tax arises:
"Net income from appellant's intrastate, interstate, and foreign business attributable to California,
may be taken into account in computing the tax. As
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the taxing jurisdiction of California extends to that
income, the use thereof to compute the tax may not
be said to be arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Plaintiff has qualified to do business in this state.
When Utah granted it the privilege of exercising a corporate
franchise in Utah, the company must, of necessity, bear its
burden of taxes in order to retain this privilege. If an
individual operated the same business in this state and received income from intangibles, he would be forced to pay
an individual income tax on the income of such intangibles
under our law. Since the state affords the plaintiff the same
privileges and benefits that it affords an individual, the
plaintiff should pay a tax on its net income in the proportion
in which the net income is attributable to the operations in
this state. In the dictum to the recent case of Colgate vs.
Harvey, 296 U. S. at page 422, 56 S. Ct. 252, the Supreme
Court of the United States acknowledged the difficulty of
determining the constitutionality of taxing statutes. It
stated:
"This court has frequently said that absolute
equality in taxation cannot be obtained, and is not
required under the Fourteenth Amendment. * * *
The boundary between what is permissable and what
is forbidden by the constitutional requirement has
never been precisely fixed, and is incapable of exact
delimitation. In the great variety of cases which
have arisen, decisions may seem to be difficult of
reconcilement; but investigation will generally cause
apparent conflicts to disappear when due weight is
given to material circumstances which distinguish

the cases. If the evident intent and general operation
of the tax legislation is to adjust the burden with a
fair and reasonable degree of equality, the constitutional requirement is satisfied. We think the provision now under consideration meets this test."
We submit that the application of the allocation formula is, under the circumstances, justified, and that an unfair burden is not imposed on the plaintiff, nor is it denied
the equal protection granted under the Constitution of the
United States and of the State of Utah.
SUMMARY

lt is respectfully submitted that this brief fully covers
the objections raised by the plaintiff in its brief, and that
we have proved each objection to be untenable. The Utah
Corporation Franchise Tax Act, in our opinion, clearly delegates authority to the State Tax Commission to depart from
the statutory allocation fraction to apportion the net income fairly and equitably attributable to this State. Such
authority has been held constitutional in other jurisdictions.
Because of the change in the plaintiff's accounting

methods and corporate structure, so that the company
deemed no gross receipts to have resulted from business done
in this State, this commission had sufficient evidence before
it to find that there were actually gross receipts. Such findings clearly justified it in departing from the statutory
allocation fraction and in turn calculating a new allocation
fraction using three factors; namely, (1) tangible property
in Utah, which is a part of the statutory formula; (2) salaries and wages payable in Utah, which also is a part of the
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statutory formula; and (3) receipts from products manufactured or produced in Utah. The adoption of such a formula was not unreasonable nor arbitrary and, according
to legal authorities, did not deprive this plantiff of its property without due process of law. On the other hand, we have
shown that it apportioned the net income of this company
from operations in Utah fairly and equitably to this State.
We submit that where a taxpayer, as in the instant
case, claims that the allocation formula adopted by the tax
commission deprives it of its property, it must submit evidence and facts to show that the adoption of such a formula
violates its rights, and it must then go forward in proving
that such a method is unconstitutional. We submit that the
plaintiff herein did not, nor has to the present time, furnished one iota of evidence to sustain this burden, and that
having failed to sustain such burden, it cannot now complain that the formula, as adopted by the commission, is
unreasonable or arbitrary.
Lastly, it is our contention that intangible property
held by the plaintiff in a New York Office resulted from its
main business operations, and that having resulted from
such operations, it is incidental thereto. In the same manner
in which the operations of the company are apportioned to
the respective states in which it does business, so should the
income from intangibles resulting from those operations
be apportioned. In this manner an equitable result is reached
and a just apportionment made. The apportioning of such
income, we submit, is not unconstitutional.
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Therefore, under the facts as disclosed by the record in
this case, and the established rules of law and authorities
herein cited, the decision of the State Tax Commission
should be sustained by this court.
Respectfully submitted,

ALFRED KLEIN,
GRANT A. BROWN,
ALVIN I. SMITH,
Attorneys for Defendwnt.

